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Throughout Africa, charismatic Christianity has been caricatured as an
inhibitor of democratization. Its adherents are said either to withdraw from
the rough and tumble of politics (‘pietism’) or to preach a prosperity gospel
that encourages believers to pour their resources into their churches in the
hope that God will ‘bless’ them. Both courses of action are said to
encourage such people to be politically quietist, with no interest in
democratization or other forms of political activity. This is said to thwart
democratization. This article utilizes an ethnographic case study of a
‘progressive’ charismatic congregation in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 2007, to
provide evidence that ‘pietism’ and ‘prosperity’ are not the only options for
charismatic Christianity. Drawing on the concept of ‘spiritual capital’, it
argues that some varieties of charismatic Christianity have the resources to
contribute to democratization. For example, this congregation’s self-styled
‘de-institutionalization’ process is opening up new avenues for people to
learn democratic skills and develop a worldview that is relationship-centred,
participatory, and anti-authoritarian. The article concludes that spiritual
capital can be a useful tool for analysing the role of religions in
democratizations. It notes, however, that analysts should take care to
identify and understand what variety of spiritual capital is generated in
particular situations, focusing on the worldviews it produces and the
consequences of those worldviews for democratization.
Keywords: spiritual capital; democratization; religion; charismatic
Christianity; Zimbabwe
Introduction: democratization in Zimbabwe
There has been considerable debate about how democratization in Africa should be
evaluated.1 There is an emerging realization that African democracies cannot be
judged against Western standards and conceptions, which are contextually
rooted in the West’s own historical development. So Salih, drawing on Merkel
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and Dahl, develops a ‘polyarchical’ evaluation which assesses democracy
according to these criteria2:
(1) freedom to form and join organizations;
(2) freedom of expression and alternative sources of information; and
(3) eligibility for public ofﬁce and the right of political leaders to compete for
support and votes in free and fair elections.
Koelble and Lipuma push the debate further, claiming that most standards
used to evaluate democratization are ‘EuroAmerican’ and therefore inappropri-
ate for assessing post-colonial political developments in Africa.3 They argue
that ‘the real measure of democracy is the extent to which governance conforms
to the visions of democracy worked out by the governed’.4 The task of the
political analyst, then, becomes one of determining the values and standards
of the host population. Consequently, analysts should seek to evaluate political
institutions and practices according to the extent to which they meet the popu-
lation’s expectations – not the extent to which they conform to EuroAmerican
ideal types.
Disagreements about how analysts should evaluate democracy are a key aspect
of a debate between various scholars – including, Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole5
and Moore6 – about how Zimbabweans really think about democratization in their
country. Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole draw on recent Afrobarometer survey
results to argue that Zimbabweans’ enthusiasm for democracy is waning. On the
other hand, Moore interprets these results to mean that Zimbabweans simply
realize that what passes for democracy in their country does not meet their own
standards for good governance.
However, these debates are interesting but inconclusive. One thing that does
seem beyond dispute is that democratization in Zimbabwe – whether evaluated
by external EuroAmerican or by contextual Zimbabwean standards – has been
thwarted.7 This is surprising. After Zimbabwe won its independence from white-
run Rhodesia in 1980, there were signs that it would become a democratic
success story. The new prime minister, Robert Mugabe, promised ‘reconciliation’
with the whites. The agricultural sector, dominated by whites, was initially left
largely untouched and food production soared. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African
National Union-Popular Front (ZANU-PF) government initially undertook much
needed reforms in health and education, and a substantial, well-educated black
middle class developed. But these successes masked other tensions and political
intrigues.8 Ndebele people in theMatabeleland region of Zimbabwe faced violence
and killings on a massive scale during the Gukurahundi massacres following inde-
pendence.9 Raftopoulos has interpreted this as an attempt by Mugabe to subordi-
nate his rivals in the name of national ‘unity’.10 ZANU-PF inherited economic
problems from the Rhodesian regime, including a large foreign debt. ZANU-
PF’s land reform and redistribution policies progressed at a slow but steady pace
in the ﬁrst decade after independence, but stalled dramatically during the
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1990s.11 While these policies were initially supported ﬁnancially by the British
government, it eventually withdrew its support.12 Over time, Zimbabwe’s
foreign debt became ‘unpayable’, and far-reaching Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes were imposed by the International Monetary Fund, as a condition of
further ﬁnancial assistance.13 Over time, economic concerns were reﬂected in pol-
itical developments. Signiﬁcant rumblings of discontent among citizens were
heard in 2000, when Zimbabweans rejected a referendum to amend the consti-
tution, which would have given Mugabe more powers as president. Mugabe
claimed he would accept this result.14 But within days, violent and haphazard
‘invasions’ of white-run farms began.15
At the same time, censorship of the media and the oppression of a newly estab-
lished political party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC, formed in
1999) and civil society groups increased.16 The MDC’s efforts to secure political
change were repeatedly foiled by rigged elections, violent intimidation, and
internal divisions. Similarly, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was
established to pressurize the government to reform the constitution. In addition,
Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) was formed to publicize state repression
through demonstrations. Both NCA and WOZA were violently suppressed by
security forces. It was difﬁcult to access independent media and education,
especially in rural areas. ZANU-PF instituted a thorough propaganda campaign
via both the media and the teaching of ‘patriotic history’.17
Following elections in 2008, ZANU-PF eventually agreed to a power sharing
government with the MDC. However, ZANU-PF retained control of the police and
security forces, which involved a difﬁcult compromise for the MDC. Questions
remain about Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s sincerity in accepting the coalition.
While this power-sharing experiment might be considered a step towards democra-
tization, the workability of the coalition is uncertain. Some schools have re-opened,
there is more food in shops, and prices of some basic goods have decreased.18 But
the political climate remains strained and there appears to have been few other
improvements in the everyday lives of citizens.19 For Inglehart and Welzel,
socio-economic development is the crucial variable that leads to conditions that
allow people to develop ‘self-expression values’, which in turn forms the basis
of ‘effective democracy’.20 These conditions are clearly absent in Zimbabwe
today, where the main concern of most citizens is no doubt everyday survival.
At the time of my ﬁeldwork in February–April 2007, 80% of Zimbabweans
lived below the poverty line and the annual inﬂation rate was 2,200%.21 By July
2008 annual inﬂation was calculated at 231,000,000% – the last ﬁgure that was
released. In an attempt to curb inﬂation, in January 2009 the government
allowed trading in foreign currencies.22
Despite the challenges such difﬁcult economic circumstances pose to everyday
activities, Raftopoulos and Alexander provide evidence of increased activism
amongst groups in Zimbabwe’s public sphere.23 Although groups such as the
NCA, the trade unions and some of the churches initially focused on regime
change, Raftopoulos and Alexander identify a recent shift towards human rights
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discourses, constitutional reform, and publicizing injustices. For example, such
groups (especially networks of churches) played a role in publicizing Operation
Murumbatsvina in 2005. This was a large-scale demolition of houses in high
density suburbs of Harare, areas that mainly supported the MDC.24 In 2006,
WOZA conducted nationwide consultations and produced a ‘People’s Charter’
that outlined an alternative vision of Zimbabwean society and politics. In
Koelble and Lipuma’s terms, these groups mobilized largely because the Zimbab-
wean state was failing ‘miserably to meet the standards of the Zimbabwean citi-
zenry’.25 Koelble and Lipuma claim:
There is a growing chasm between the visions of democracy circulating in the Zim-
babwean public sphere and the political practices of the Mugabe government. In the
eyes of Zimbabwe’s democrats, Mugabe’s razing of the shanty settlements surround-
ing Harare in mid-2005 is anti-democratic less because it violates their [Zimbab-
weans] version of individual rights than because it violates their [Zimbabweans]
sense of community and the right to have a place of belonging.26
The Christian churches were prominent in publicizing the injustice of Oper-
ation Murambatsvina. Three-quarters of Zimbabweans are practising Christianity
and, as a result, churches and related organizations play a signiﬁcant role in
the social lives of many citizens.27 Given that in many rural areas the church
and the school are the only public institutions, Christian organizations are prob-
ably the most high-proﬁle throughout Zimbabwean civil society as a whole.28
This made such organizations well-placed to respond to the poor economic
and political conditions in the country. But the roles of these different churches
and organizations are diverse, with some choosing to address the difﬁcult cir-
cumstances directly, and others judging that it is not their place to do so. Think-
ing of churches and organizations in terms of the variety of ‘spiritual capital’
which they produce may be helpful in analyzing their role in responding to Zim-
babwe’s poor political and economic context, including their ability to contribute
to democratization.
Spiritual capital and democratization
‘Spiritual capital’ has its roots in the development of the concept of ‘social capital’.
Putnam is the major ﬁgure in this ﬁeld, deﬁning social capital in terms of networks
of relationships within (bonding social capital) and between (bridging social
capital) groups and individuals.29 These relationships are said to nurture trust,
laying foundations not only for the ﬂourishing of society and the economy but
also a better quality of democracy. Writing from and within an American
context, Putnam observes that nearly half of all volunteering and personal philan-
thropy in the USA is church-related. He argues that religious attachment enhances
participation in secular civic activity. Norris and Inglehart note that participation in
religious worship services does not correlate with greater civic activity, but that
participation in religious organizations does correlate with greater civic activity.30
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Scholars have also begun referring to ‘religious capital’ and ‘spiritual
capital’.31 Yet, the ways these terms are used in the literature is often confusing.
At times they are conﬂated and seem to mean the same thing, while at other
times scholars draw distinctions between them. Carkoglu has distinguished
between religious and spiritual capital, differentiating between them by drawing
an analogous relationship with bonding and bridging social capital.32 For him, reli-
gious capital produces exclusivist ‘bonding’ identities, while spiritual capital is a
‘bridging’ resource that inspires people to act to help others beyond their immedi-
ate comfort zone. While this is an interesting distinction, it is not widespread in the
literature. Rather, the trend seems to be to abandon use of the term religious capital
(which was common in the early 1990s)33 in favour of spiritual capital. Con-
ceptions of spiritual capital retain the emphasis on the individual that is present
in earlier discussions of religious capital,34 while at the same time exploring
how religious ideas and activities can have wider social and political impacts.
For example, Berger and Hefner argue that there are varieties of spiritual capital
within the world religions. These varieties promote different values, producing
different worldviews about a number of issues, including democratization and
development.35 For Haynes, spiritual capital introduces an extra dimension to
development. Development then is not just about material progress but also
about ‘redemptive hopes and expectations’.36 Following this convention, from
here I will use the term spiritual capital in this article.
In order to develop the analytical worth of the term ‘spiritual capital’ in relation
to democratization, it is necessary to focus on both empirical and comparative
research, which note that there are varieties of spiritual capital. At the same
time, we need to analyse both religious actors’ ideas and practices and networks.
Following the argument put forward by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, this article suggests that religious ideas can have a wide,
diffuse cultural impact, including an impact on democratization.37
Spiritual capital, democratization and charismatic Christianity in Africa
Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of religion in demo-
cratization in Africa.38 For example, Haynes analyses the role of both elite level
leaders and popular religious movements across the continent, concluding that
while there have been important examples in which religion has played a democra-
tizing role (such as South Africa), on the whole ‘religious actors have not been able
to help advance democracy beyond a stage often characterized by cosmetic rather
than substantial changes’.39 Ranger’s recent edited volume updates and at times
challenges this conclusion.40 Ranger divides Africa’s democratic history into
three phases, and explores the role of the churches during each era or ‘revolution’.
He says that across the continent mainline churches, such as the Catholic and estab-
lished Protestant mission churches, took centre stage during the ‘ﬁrst democratic
revolution’ anti-colonial struggles. Yet, their role was ambiguous, with some
churches legitimating and supporting white-led minority regimes, and others
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challenging them. Charismatic41 churches were conspicuously absent from politics
in the 1950s and 1960s. Charismatic churches include both mission churches and
home-grown churches, and can be characterized by their belief in the bible as an
infallible guide to faith, their imperative to evangelize, and their emphasis on
deep-felt religious experiences such as conversion, speaking in tongues, and
belief in miracles. Over time, these churches either withdrew altogether from poli-
tics or offered repressive regimes their tacit support. This was a dominant pattern in
Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe.42
Ranger dates the next phase of African democratic history, the ‘second demo-
cratic revolution’, from the late 1980s. This was concerned with addressing the
injustices perpetrated by the post-colonial governments. Ranger claims that the
mainline churches retained enough independence and moral authority to speak out
against violence, militarism and one-party rule. However, as Haynes has noted,
their authority and inﬂuence were often limited.43 As in the ﬁrst anti-colonial
democratic revolution, Ranger does not consider the role of charismatic churches
during this era to be substantial. Ranger’s depiction of the ‘third democratic
revolution’, which he dates from the early 1990s to the present, ascribes a different
role altogether to charismatic churches. No longer on the margins of mainline
Christianity, they are growing rapidly in many African countries. Using South
African charismatic churches as an example, Ranger claims that by virtue of their
numbers and their promotion of a ‘moral opposition to the new nationalist order’,44
they are now crucial to ensuring ‘the sustainability of democracy’ in Africa.45
This conclusion echoes an earlier, ‘cultural potentiality argument’ about
charismatic Christianity.46 Advocates of this view, including Maxwell, claim that
people involved in highly participatory charismatic churches would learn skills
necessary to become democratic citizens.47 Freston noted, however, that such
arguments were not rooted in much empirical evidence.48 But Ranger’s volume,
featuring country-by-country case studies, provides examples of charismatic and
evangelical Christians in Africa who have become purveyors of moral opposition
to repressive governments, by seeking to address current crises of morality,
poverty and conﬂict.49 Jenkins explains this by arguing that the social and political
world experienced by many African Christians is much like the world depicted in
the Bible. He argues that Africans identify with the suffering of those who Jesus
came to liberate, and are hence inspired to work for liberation themselves. Miller
and Yamamori’s global study of what they term ‘progressive Pentecostalism’
reveals similar trends of activism on behalf of the poor in various parts of the
world.50 Note, however, that while Miller and Yamamori do not claim that all
expressions of Pentecostalism are ‘progressive’, their study does conﬁrm trends
and changes identiﬁed by Ranger and Jenkins.
Gifford – who wrote an afterword to Ranger’s edited volume – remains scep-
tical about the role of charismatic Christianity in relation to democratization in
Africa. He questions the spread and signiﬁcance of the examples of socio-political
engagement upon which Ranger and his contributors focus. For Gifford, the most
signiﬁcant scriptural paradigms in Africa remain the ‘faith gospel’ (or prosperity
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gospel) and ‘demonic possession’. He contends that the ‘demonic possession’
paradigm undermines human agency by ascribing power to demons, ‘divert[ing]
attention from a more obviously political level of analysis’.51 Gifford argues that
as long as African Christians interpret the bible in such ways, then their Christianity
will not help them to overcome repressive governments, poverty, or achieve a
democratic political culture.
Progressive charismatic Christianity: Mount Pleasant Community Church
Mukonyora’s recent research on ‘salt of the earth’ evangelicals in Zimbabwe, who
could be considered part of Miller and Yamamori’s progressive strand, indicates
that this strand is more likely than others to promote democracy.52 She claims
that ‘salt of the earth’ evangelicals ‘seek to function as . . . “school(s) of democracy”
in the sense that they emphasize Christian ideals of love, peace, and harmony
and seek to oppose political injustice’.53 This study engages with an example of
the progressive variety in Zimbabwe, the Mount Pleasant Community Church.
I chose Mount Pleasant Community Church (MPCC) as a case study for the
following reasons. First, I wanted to demonstrate how one small group of people
from the wider yet often-overlooked progressive charismatic perspective try to
deal with Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises. Secondly, few recent
studies focus on congregations in Zimbabwe. Most of the current information
coming out of Zimbabwe focuses on prominent clerics or Christian organizations,
such as the former Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube, Christian Alli-
ance, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, or the Catholic Commission on
Justice and Peace.54
MPCC is physically located in a relatively wealthy suburb near the University
of Zimbabwe in Harare. People who attend the church are mainly well educated,
young (under 35 years of age), and middle class. These factors make MPCC
unusual in the Zimbabwean context.55
The most signiﬁcant ﬁndings of the case study are related to a process of
change within MPCC, which people call ‘de-institutionalization’. The best way
to understand de-institutionalization is to describe how it has occurred.56
De-institutionalization: changing structures, changing leadership
The term de-institutionalization refers to the way the MPCC congregation has
sought to reduce or even eliminate structured events and activities. In interviews,
people said they have done this because these events and activities were no longer
helping them to develop their faith. Secondly, de-institutionalization refers to the
fact that many congregation members now believe less than before in the authority
of elders and other leaders. This is said to be an ‘organic’ process, occurring
with the enthusiastic support of the elders, who were keen to stand down from
their leadership roles, including fulltime paid employment by the congregation.
The justiﬁcation, the elders said, was that this was truer to the biblical model of
1178 G. Ganiel
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leadership – the Apostle Paul, after all, was a tentmaker as well as a minister of the
gospel. The elders – an Ndebele man and a white man – expressed these views to
me in a joint interview in March 2007.
People dated the beginning of de-institutionalization to 2002, when people
began to develop these ideas at once-per-week prayer meetings. By 2005, the
prayer meetings were taking place ﬁve days a week. People said God spoke to
them then, and God said that they were depending too much on the MPCC
leaders and other structures to interpret the bible for them and to discern ‘God’s
will’ for their lives. People identiﬁed ‘structures’ as cell groups (that is, small
bible study groups that meet during the week) and other organized activities
such as men’s breakfasts and women’s fellowship meetings. Consequently, the
cell groups were replaced by smaller ‘discipleship groups’. Discipleship groups
consisted of people from the congregation who met on a regular basis to pray,
study the bible, and share a meal. These groups were intended to promote
deeper spiritual growth, more meaningful relationships with others, and depen-
dence upon God in the sense that people would no longer require elders or
leaders to interpret the scriptures or ‘God’s will’ for them. They were however dis-
continued in 2006, from which time regular participants in the prayer meetings
encouraged others to attend prayer meetings and to meet informally in homes.
The elders said they supported these developments at worship services. In my
interviews, people at MPCC said some of the results of the changes outlined
above were that they no longer expected the elders or other leaders in the congre-
gation to ‘spoon feed’ them with interpretations of scripture or to discern ‘God’s
will’ for them.
Despite the process of de-institutionalization, elders and some lay leaders still
prepared sermons for Sunday morning worship services. This was reported to me
in interviews with elders and lay leaders, and I observed that such people would
bring prepared sermon notes to services. But the participation of congregants in
the services increased from 2002. By 2007, at least the ﬁrst hour of a Sunday
service was devoted to spontaneous prayer, worship and testimonies. Sometimes
a congregant shared a spontaneous sermon, and the prepared sermon was never
delivered. Elders said that this way of worshiping re-enforced the biblical idea
of the ‘priesthood of all believers’, removing authority from the elders and
placing it in all the people, where it rightfully belonged.57
This is unlike the authoritarian structure of congregational life that Maxwell
documents in his study of the Pentecostal Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa
(ZAOGA) denomination.58 Rather, de-institutionalization at MPCC has produced
a congregation in which many people felt empowered to think for themselves and
contribute to decision-making within the congregation. All 18 people I interviewed
said that they were now thinking and doing more for themselves. Others in the con-
gregation also mentioned this in casual conversations.59 This is notable, as many
African cultures have been regarded as hierarchical or even dictatorial, presenting
a view that elites often wield unchallenged power.60 The voluntary laying down of
power by the people in positions of authority in MPCC (even though this is on a
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small scale) provides an alternative to that generalization. On the other hand, some
people at MPCC were concerned about the potential for leaders to ‘abdicate’ their
roles and to allow the congregation to become too inward-looking, neglecting
service to the poor when times got tough. They also worried that a congregation
with so few ‘structures’ could be easily shaken by personality clashes and internal
power struggles.61
De-institutionalization in the MPCC at the congregational level produced what
I regard as an example of participatory democracy. Many members of the congre-
gation rejected authoritarian leadership in favour of a form of equality whereby
church members were encouraged to participate in all aspects of congregational
life. This process is similar to that observed by Freston, and some of the scholars
in Ranger’s volume, who see churches in Africa as empowering people as they
learn skills that can be transferred to participating in democratic politics.62 Regard-
ing the concerns of this article, we can note that the spiritual capital generated at
MPCC produces a worldview which was participatory, anti-authoritarian and
relationship-centred; it also dovetails well more generally with democratic prin-
ciples in a wider political sense. The following sections explore how such a world-
view developed at the micro-level through the articulation of empowering religious
ideas, which were then nurtured and developed through networks of relationships.
Ideas and the development of spiritual capital
Research on ‘new social movements’ has emphasized the importance of ideas for
encouraging political change. For example, members of such movements may
develop ideas to justify the actions they take to try to bring about social and pol-
itical change.63 Similarly, people at MPCC developed ideas to justify the removing
of structured activities and the redeﬁnition of leadership that deﬁnes the de-institu-
tionalization process. Many members of the church attach great importance to what
is said during worship services and prayer meetings, interpreting these words as the
prompting of the Holy Spirit or God’s direct revelation. Through analysis of my
interviews, ﬁeld notes, and consultation with the elders, I identify four major dis-
cursive themes: (1) Relationships (with God and with others), (2) Acknowledging
difﬁculties/injustices and yet persevering, (3) Waiting, and (4) Action through
service. A detailed analysis of the content of these discursive themes is beyond
the scope of this paper, although I have begun this elsewhere.64
These discourses are linked together, logically building upon each other and
ultimately justifying action to serve the poor and in some cases to critique the
government. The emphasis on action is crucial in a Zimbabwean context where
charismatic Christians have either been accused of pietist withdrawal from
society and politics or a passive adherence to the prosperity gospel.65 The relation-
ships between the discourses can be explained as follows. Discourses about
relationships explain how trusting relationships are built. Trusting relationships
allow people to freely and openly acknowledge the difﬁculties and injustices in
their lives and in the wider society. This is not something that can be taken for
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granted in Zimbabwe, where it can be dangerous to criticize the government or
even to imply that government policies are unjust. Then, once people start to
talk about injustices, they move to speaking about patiently waiting for God’s
deliverance, and/or taking God-inspired action through service.
The way discourses build upon each other can be illustrated in the conduct of a
prayer meeting in February 2007, where a handful of people gathered. The meeting
started with a man called Simeon66 reading Colossians 3:15/16:
Let the peace of Christ rule in your hearts, since as members of one body you were
called to peace. And be thankful. Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly as you
teach and admonish one another with all wisdom, and as you sing psalms, hymns
and spiritual songs with gratitude in your hearts to God.
This particular passage of scripture emphasizes the importance of relationships
between individuals and God (let Christ rule in your hearts) and among individuals
(teach and admonish one another).
Simeon’s contribution was followed by a period of silence, during which time
Ben entered the meeting. After silence for several minutes, he said that he was
reading Psalm 33 during the day and found it encouraging. Ben read it, emphasiz-
ing the verses from 12 onwards:
Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, the people he chose for his inheritance.
From heaven the Lord looks down and sees all mankind; from his dwelling-place he
watches all who live on earth . . . no king is saved by the size of his army; no warrior
escapes by his great strength. . ..
This scripture emphasizes the idea that God is just, and even those rulers who abuse
their power (no warrior escapes by his great strength) will one day face his
judgment.
Then a man called Jabulani read I John 3:18: ‘Dear children, let us not love with
words or tongue but with actions and in truth.’ He quoted from the book of James,
where it talks about showing faith by your works. He said that love in action is dif-
ﬁcult to implement when you think about the acts that the early church considered
normal, such as, selling what they had and having all material goods in common.
He posed the question to everyone:What do we do? Dowe press on with this vision
God has given? Or do we wait and then God has to bring it before us again? His
implication was that people should be acting now on their faith.
Simeon then referred back to what Ben had said, noting that it was amazing that
God meets our individual needs and helps us to meet others’ needs. He said that the
way others get to experience God is through the deeds that we do. He then read
Psalm 96, emphasizing verses 10–13:
Say among the nations, the Lord reigns. The world is ﬁrmly established, it cannot be
moved; he will judge the peoples with equity. Let the heavens rejoice, let the earth be
glad; let the sea resound, and all that is in it; let the ﬁelds be jubilant, and everything in
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them. Then all the trees of the forest will sing for joy; they will sing before the Lord
for he comes, he comes to judge the earth. He will judge the world in righteousness
and the peoples in his truth.
Again, this scripture emphasizes God’s just judgment. That, linked with prior
points made about the need to put their faith in action, provides an example of
how people utilized the bible to interpret their present situations and to justify
doing something to change those situations for the better.
Later in the meeting, after prayers about meeting individual needs, such as, pro-
viding food for relatives and paying school fees, Ben quoted Romans 5:5 and said
that we live in a poverty-stricken nation, where there is a ‘terrible situation’. He
thanked God for the groceries that people from MPCC purchased the day before
for orphans and child-headed homes. He said that although none of them made a
lot of money, they should not make excuses about being unable to help. His
comment reﬂected a trend where people from the middle classes, like those at
MPCC, had seen a dip in the real value of their salaries, due to inﬂation. Even
some medical doctors in the congregation had set up small businesses on the
side to try and make ends meet. He then quoted Psalm 33 again, saying the Lord
‘loves righteousness and justice’ and that he had promised to bring it about on
earth. Ben then said that some of the economic policies in the country just were
not fair. He mentioned the dual government and black market monetary exchange
rates. He prayed that God would encourage people like the nineteenth century anti-
slavery campaigner, William Wilberforce, that is, politicians who would do what
was good and just and right for the beneﬁt of the whole nation. This was an explicit
critique of the government, articulated during a typical meeting. It was signiﬁcant
in that it highlighted injustice, locating its root in the dysfunctional politics of the
country. It should be noted, however, that I never heard anyone at MPCC advocate
direct action against the government. Rather, when they advocated action, they
talked primarily about service to the poor and needy – those whose lives had
become so difﬁcult in large part due to unjust government policies.
In sum, we have explored examples of religious discourses that encouraged and
justiﬁed action to serve the poor and, implicitly, to reform political leadership –
issues crucial for democratization outcomes in Zimbabwe. There were, however,
limits both to these discourses and how MPCC members understood them. For
example, some MPCC people criticized what they saw as their congregation’s
unwillingness to speak out explicitly against the government, as organizations
such as the Christian Alliance have done.67 They believed this limited their congre-
gation’s potential to contribute to achieving justice in their country. I also asked
some people if they thought that what their congregation was saying and doing
was ‘political’, and they said ‘no’. Perhaps surprisingly, MPCC members did not
appear to make conscious links between what was happening in their congregation
and wider social and political processes. While as a social scientist I may identify a
worldview within MPCC that seems conducive to producing democratic citizens,
many MPCC members saw themselves as doing God’s work, meeting immediate
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needs and making the world around them just a little more bearable for others.
Even so, people at the grassroots, including MPCC members are de facto creating
democratic spaces, whereby they can develop their own ideas about their religion
and the kind of society they want to live in. The ability to do this is itself essential to
democratization. Now we turn to ways in which such ideas are spread within
Zimbabwe.
Networks and the development of spiritual capital in Zimbabwe: impact on
democratization
MPCC’s emphasis on relationships ensures that most congregants have rich net-
works of relationships both within and without the congregation. This does not
mean that people in other congregations or organizations do not participate in
such networks. But everyone I talked with at MPCC said that de-institutionaliza-
tion prompted them to cultivate their personal networks. This resulted in an
increased level of social activism by people in the congregation. MPCC congre-
gants also told me that those who already worked or volunteered for non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) felt their work was better appreciated.68 There were
also new congregational initiatives to provide for orphans and widows in Harare’s
high-density suburbs, and in poor, rural areas, several hours’ drive from the capital.
MPCC includes a number of medical doctors among its members, so such activities
also included medical missions whereby poor people received free health care.
MPCC also has several sister congregations throughout Zimbabwe, associated
with the United Kingdom-based New Frontiers Network of charismatic churches.
MPCC publicizes the activities of these congregations and the Zimbabwe-based
ministries of New Frontiers, including a widespread eco-farming project called
‘Farming God’s Way’, based at another congregation in Harare. Several people I
spoke with at MPCC had collaborated with or worked for the Farming God’s
Way initiative. Activities such as the medical missions and farming initiative
drew on the particular strengths of people at MPCC and directly addressed the
adverse effects of the economic and political crises by providing health care and
a source of food.
The cultivation of such networks is crucial to democratization. Many MPCC
members subsequently felt empowered to begin new initiatives to address the
pressing social and economic needs brought on by the political crisis. They at
least implicitly recognized that the state had failed to deliver on its developmental
agenda and that as a result citizens would need to step in to undertake such activi-
ties to the extent they were able. The wider point is that democratization is not poss-
ible unless people believe that their actions to address social and political problems
can make a tangible difference, even if it is small and incremental. Further, many
people I spoke with inMPCC emphasized that their activism was not simply a form
of philanthropic aid, rather it was aimed to help poor people take greater and better
care of themselves. Thus, MPCC visits orphans, widows and the rural poor,
suggesting practical tips on job training and farming. The spread of these skills
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is also important to democratization, as democratic politics is very difﬁcult or
impossible until or unless people’s most basic economic and health needs are
met.69 In other words, assistance poor people receive from MPCC may help
enable them to move beyond a concern with basic survival to a greater concern
for political changes, including a demand for democracy. Finally, MPCC’s partici-
patory, anti-authoritarian and relationship-centred worldview might spread beyond
the congregation by way of these networks. It is however beyond the scope of this
article to examine if or to what extent the religiously-based discourses articulated at
MPCC are present in other congregations and organizations in the country, includ-
ing the issues of networks generally and whether people recognize that such ideas
in particular stem from the MPCC. Further research focusing on how ideas and
skills are transmitted through networks such as these is needed for a fuller under-
standing of the links between spiritual capital and how religious networks might
facilitate democratization in Zimbabwe.
Conclusions: spiritual capital at the macro-level and the potential for
democratization?
There is a great deal of confusion in the literature about spiritual capital and its
relationship to democratization. Accordingly, part of the work of this article has
been to develop a clearer conception of spiritual capital. This included both its
micro-level aspects (including the religious ideas and networks of individuals)
and its macro-level aspects (how religious ideas and practices might have a
wider impact on culture, society and politics). The concept also is useful as an ana-
lytic framework for mapping diverse religious worldviews. But questions remain
about the extent that spiritual capital can have an impact at the macro-level. Fol-
lowing Weber and Wuthnow, the next logical step is attempting to identify if or
to what extent such religious worldviews pass into wider public consciousness.70
This article has identiﬁed a religious worldview at MPCC that is relationship-
centred, participatory and anti-authoritarian. It has obvious resonances with a pol-
itical worldview that might inform a desire for democratization and consequently if
it were to spread more widely in Zimbabwe, it could potentially encourage a wider
democratization process. As discussed, this can potentially happen as the relevant
ideas and practices are transmitted by religious networks in the country. MPCC has
well-established networks of relationships with other congregations and organiz-
ations within charismatic Christianity within Zimbabwe. But it is not clear that
MPCC has developed strong networks with the mainline churches or with charis-
matic churches outside of the New Frontiers network, which could mean that other
Christians may never learn about its ideas or practices.
In their work on contemporary Zimbabwean civil society, Raftopoulos and
Alexander claim that church-based organizations and congregations are amongst
the most active and prominent in the country. At the same time, they acknowledge
that little is known about the extent that such organizations are able to spread their
ideas and effective practices.71 As a case study, my research at MPCC is similarly
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limited. This points to the necessity of a more ambitious research agenda, building
on this ﬁrst step to identify varieties of spiritual capital conducive to democratiza-
tion. The next step is to evaluate if or how such varieties of spiritual capital are
being spread, asking if they are reaching critical tipping points in which their
ideas and practices could lead to widespread democratic changes.
This could in turn aid in our understanding of how Christian churches and
organizations can contribute to a wider democratization process in Zimbabwe. It
is clear that such churches enjoy high levels of citizen trust, thus carrying a
moral authority that the government and some other civil society groups lack.72
Indeed, ZANU-PF has recognized that some of the churches represent a challenge
to its authority, as well as an alternative power base. For example, the BBC
reported that many Zimbabweans believe that ZANU-PF was behind the 2007
sex scandal involving the government’s most prominent critic, Archbishop Pius
Ncube.73 Certainly, compromising images of Ncube were prominent in state-run
newspapers and television.74 Ncube resigned his position as archbishop and has
not been as prominent a public ﬁgure as he was before the scandal broke.75 It
seems ZANU-PF feels compelled to silence church-based critics who ground
their discourses in biblical ideals of justice for the poor, and critiques of unjust lea-
dership. Further, ZANU-PF has orchestrated its own campaigns of religiously-
based rhetoric in an attempt to legitimate its positions, for example to justify
farm seizures.76 The fact that ZANU-PF appears to take religion so seriously indi-
cates that in the Zimbabwean public sphere, religious discourses matter.
Whether these discourses and the actions that ﬂow from them can contribute to
wider progress of democratization in Zimbabwe remains to be seen. Research by
the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) in 2008 indi-
cated that of all civil society groups in Zimbabwe, the churches have been the
most consistent in placing healing and reconciliation on the public agenda.77
‘The ZimbabweWeWant,’ a discussion document prepared for civil society organ-
izations and government ofﬁcials by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference,
the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches,
identiﬁed important political issues to be addressed, including reconciliation of
opposing groups.78 It cannot be demonstrated deﬁnitively, but it may be the case
that the churches’ public discourses on reconciliation helped create a climate in
which the new power-sharing government included a ministerial post for
Healing, Reconciliation and Integration. Like the rebuilding of the economy, the
rebuilding of trusting social relationships through a society-wide reconciliation
process is an important precursor to democratization.
Finally, the MDC’s Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, has indicated that he
wishes to promote free expression and lift restrictions on the press.79 But even
as Tsvangirai touredWestern nations in June 2009, wooing donors and seeking dip-
lomatic respectability, Amnesty International warned that civil rights activists were
still being arrested and that citizens still lived in fear.80 It may be the case that with
the advent of the power-sharing government, Christian churches, organizations and
other civil society groups would become bolder in advocating and working for
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social and political change. But there are still many obstacles to overcome before
democratization can be realized in Zimbabwe.
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